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Discretion and Criminal Law: The Good,
the Bad, and the Mundane*
George C. Thomas, III**
Discretion in enforcement and prosecution of crime is inevitable; it
can be restrained at the margin but it cannot be eliminated. Usually
when an academic speaks of discretion in the enforcement and
prosecution of criminal law, you can expect a diatribe about how the
system should be radically changed to eliminate or greatly restrain that
discretion. I come, however, largely to acknowledge Caesar rather than
to bury him. Any system that permits an almost limitless set of decision
points for police and prosecutors will be filled with almost limitless
discretion. Imagine the number of times a police officer could intervene
and make an arrest but does not. To take an extreme case, imagine a
police officer in Manhattan enforcing the law against jaywalking.
Presumably, the average officer working a beat sees hundreds of
jaywalkers every day and probably arrests none.
While the discretion points in a prosecutor's life are not quite so
numerous, she faces a wide range of decisions when she picks up a stack
of new files. For example, the prosecutor can dismiss the cases, give
them back to the police with a request for more evidence, begin a series
of investigations on her own, or proceed to the next step in some or all of
the cases. When the case stays in the system, most jurisdictions provide
the prosecutor with an opportunity to offer a plea deal and a wide range
of deals as to the appropriate charge and sentence. Some of the offers
are probably so extreme (high and low) that she will not be aware of
* This title, of course, is a play on the Clint Eastwood movie, The Good, the Bad,
and the Ugly. Indeed, I originally wrote the essay with "ugly" as a description of one of
the motives that underlie discretion but decided it was not very helpful in creating a
workable taxonomy of motives.
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them and thus will not consciously reject them. But they exist. I had a
second-degree murder case where the prosecutor ultimately took
manslaughter and sixty days in the county jail.
So discretion is here to stay in the enforcement and prosecution of
criminal law. Yet if we try to imagine a system that is completely
discretionary-in which there are no rules or standards, and all results
are completely within the discretion of the actors who have power-we
have just imagined either chaos or a ruthless dictatorship. Thus, we
should attempt to restrain some kinds of discretion at some points. The
question is what types of discretion and at what points. To begin to
answer that question, one must first understand the different kinds of
discretion that play out in what we loosely call the criminal justice
system.
I. Dimensions of Discretion
This essay leaves untouched several dimensions of the discretion
question. Some acts of police or prosecutors are not governed by legal
rules or norms-for example, the decision whether to set up radar on one
highway versus another-and these are outside my concern. Moreover,
discretionary acts that can be reviewed and corrected by others are likely
in a different category from acts that are essentially un-reviewable. I
focus only on the latter kind of discretionary acts. Another dimension of
the problem is that the discretion not to act might be viewed differently
from the discretion to act. The decision not to charge a crime might be
less blameworthy than the decision to charge a crime when both are
based on the same improper motive. But for purposes of this essay, I
will assume that these types of discretion have morally equivalent
consequences.
I wish to explore the motives of the criminal justice actor who is
subject to rules or norms and who essentially has final discretion. So, for
example, the police officer who pulls over a car because the driver is
black is exercising bad discretion because the motive is inappropriate.
The officer who sees a drunken driver and a speeder at the same time
exercises good discretion if he pulls over the drunken driver and lets the
speeder escape (based on the greater risk of harm posed by the drunken
driver). The officer who looks the other way when jaywalkers pour like
locusts onto the Manhattan city streets is perhaps utilizing discretion that
is neither bad nor good but merely a practical concession to the day-to-
day realities of life-the "mundane" of my title.
But even as limited in the last paragraph, there are aspects of the
problem that I will not address. For example, different offenses likely
have different tipping points for when discretion becomes "good" rather
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than "mundane." We would not, I suspect, want the police or the
prosecutor to exercise discretion not to arrest or charge someone they
believe has committed murder. Speeding and jaywalking occupy the
other end of that dimension of discretion. But trying to locate the tipping
point for various categories of offenses is beyond the scope of this essay,
if it is possible at all. Thus, I will simply use examples from different
categories.
Another dimension of the problem is that all humans act out of
mixed motives all the time. The officer who "gives" fifteen miles over
the speed limit most of the time might stop a driver who is going ten
miles over the limit in a school zone. To make matters more
complicated, bad motives can mix with neutral ones. A police officer
might decide not to stop a white motorist who is driving ninety miles per
hour because the officer is both too busy that night and a racist. It is
even possible that good motives can mix with bad ones. Consider a
prosecutor who decides not to prosecute for minor domestic violence
based on the wife's pleas that her husband would lose his job if he were
prosecuted. The prosecutor might be acting to protect the family's
breadwinner (a good motive, I will assume) and because he believes
husbands should be able to discipline their wives. To keep my
discussion as clear and simple as possible, I will engage in the artificial
assumption that we can always extract the dominant motive from the mix
of all motives.
In thinking about abstracted motives that we can label good, bad,
and mundane, it might be useful to imagine the ideal or platonic police
officer and prosecutor. The platonic police officer has no racial
stereotypes about which racial group is more or less likely to commit
particular crimes. She has no stereotypes relating to sex or gender. She
is never lazy, bored, or drunk. She never considers when her shift is
ending or when lunch is approaching in deciding whether to make an
arrest. She has an endless appetite for paperwork even if she has to
complete it on her own time. She views her job as protecting the public,
not an "us against them" mentality where anyone who is not a police
officer is potentially the enemy.
The ideal prosecutor is also unburdened with any racial or
sex/gender stereotypes. She never considers the larger political
ramifications of her decisions to prosecute or not prosecute. She has no
political ambitions, not even to be re-elected if she is so unfortunate to
live in a state where prosecutors are elected. She truly believes her
obligation is to justice rather than to achieve a high conviction rate. She
willingly opens her file for defense lawyers to examine. She goes out of
her way to ensure that innocent people are removed from the process as
soon as possible. She does not impugn the integrity or honesty of a
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witness she believes told the truth on direct examination. She does not
threaten to bring greater charges or ask for longer sentences than she
thinks justified in order to induce defendants to plea bargain. She does
not start the bargaining process by asking for a greater penalty than she
believes justified. She practices what Saturn claims for its car sales
force: a fair "price" in the beginning and no elaborate negotiations. If
the judge asks her opinion about sentencing, she will recommend a
sentence that she thinks justified, not a higher one that she thinks the
judge is willing to impose.
I hope it does not sound too cynical to suggest that no prosecutor
and no police officer will fit my platonic models. As law professors,
defense lawyers, judges, prosecutors, and police officers, we are all
human beings, and human beings have good days and bad days. We act
in ways that maximize our self-interest even when it causes harm to
others. We justify our acts even when they are not the best we could
have done. We are, in short, all too human.
1I. "Flavors" of Discretion
So what is wrong with discretion? I will wager that every one of us
has driven past police radar at greater than the speed limit. Much more
often than not, the officer will ignore the violation. I doubt that any
reader has felt anything other than relief when the police car did not pull
out to give chase. Who among us has turned ourselves in at the next
police station to remedy this obvious failure of the police officer to
enforce the law as written?
If the officer exercises discretion to arrest only speeders who are
driving recklessly or who appear drunk or who fit some kind of drug
courier profile, it is a different kind of discretion than the type I wish to
study. To keep matters simple, assume the stop is only for speeding. In
this universe of cases, the officer has to decide what constitutes speeding.
If the speed limit is sixty-five, a sixty-six on the radar gun is technically
speeding, but the officer is unlikely to stop that car for speeding. The
radar gun might be inaccurate. The case will be difficult to prove. As
the anecdotal evidence tends to show, police generally "give" so many
miles per hour over the posted limit before they bother with a speeding
stop. How many times have we seen drivers on interstates not even slow
to the speed limit when they see a "speed trap" ahead?
One might think it is not discretion if the officer gives every driver
the same five, ten or fifteen miles per hour over the posted speed limit.
But does every police officer in a city, county, or state follows the same
rule about how many miles per hour to "give" motorists before deciding
[Vol. 109:41046
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to stop the car for speeding?' More fundamentally, those who reject
discretion in enforcement presumably reject the very idea that police
departments or individual officers can decide what category of violations
to ignore, even if they apply their own "law" faithfully. The legislature
sets the speed limit on the New Jersey Turnpike, not the New Jersey
State Police and surely not the individual officer.
But speeding is just a traffic offense so who cares? I think the point
can be generalized. Do we really want police to arrest every seventeen-
year-old they see in a public park with what appears to be a marijuana
cigarette in her hand? Yet we might feel differently if the police observe
the same someone with a bag of marijuana in her lap. I assume here that
the quantity is not sufficient to give rise to a presumption of possession
with intent to sell. The difference in these two cases might be that casual
use is one kind of harm while possessing a bag of marijuana suggests a
pattern of use. Presumably, it is the latter conduct that the legislature is
seeking to deter.
For a more controversial example, imagine a case where a husband
slaps his wife and regrets the assault the moment he did it, but the police
are called by a neighbor who just happened to peer in the window. The
wife tells the officer that it has never happened before and she does not
want her husband arrested. Is it a bad use of discretion to "look the other
way" in this case? Arguably, it is not. Yet there might be a reason to
treat this case differently from the earlier examples. I shall return to this
issue later in the paper.
So far the examples have concerned the discretion to ignore an act
the officer believes violates the law. What if the officer is unsure about
guilt? What if, for example, a prostitute seeks to extort more money for
a sex act she has already performed by telling police that the john raped
her. If the officer knows the true facts, then he would know no rape
occurred. If he arrested the john in that case, it would not be discretion
but a lawless act on the part of the officer. But assume the officer
suspects, but does not know, that the sex act was consensual. This is
probably a more likely scenario; as Blackstone famously remarked, even
a prostitute can be raped. If the officer was relatively confident that the
prostitute lied, would we want the officer to decline to make the arrest?
Perhaps.
The same arguments can of course be made about prosecutors. We
1. Stuart Green recounted a conversation with an officer who said that his police
department had a standard policy of not stopping anyone for speeding unless the driver
was going at least 10 miles an hour over the limit. Even so, one officer might decide to
"give" 11 or 12 miles over the limit. To say that there is a minimum below which an
officer cannot give a ticket is not to say that every driver going 10 miles per hour over the
limit must get a ticket.
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would love the prosecutor to decide not to pursue a conviction on the
speeding ticket when we were only four miles over the limit and Barney
Fife arrested us. We would not, by the way, be at all mollified to learn
that Barney arrests every driver who exceeds the speed limit by any
amount. We would, I think, be inclined to react the way viewers of the
Andy Griffith show reacted: they laughed when Barney insisted that he
was just doing his job.'
Presumably, it is also a good thing for our benevolent prosecutor not
to pursue the marijuana charge for the cigarette in hand in the park, the
assault charge when it was atypical and the victim did not want to
prosecute, and the rape charge when the facts suggest the defendant is
innocent. Everything that is good about police discretion in these
circumstances is a fortiorari good when the prosecutor exercises her
discretion the same way.
So that leads us to the question we began with: what is wrong with
discretion? As my examples suggest, we can sort discretion into two
categories. Police and prosecutors exercise discretion when they believe
a crime has occurred and they decide not to arrest or charge the culprit-
as in the speeding, marijuana, and assault examples I mentioned earlier.
A subcategory of this kind of discretion is the decision to arrest for or
charge a lesser offense than the police/prosecutor believe occurred or to
offer a plea to a lesser offense or lesser penalty than the prosecutor
believes is justified on the facts as she knows them. A different category
is when police and prosecutors decide that no crime has occurred-the
alleged rape example.
1 first thought these acts of discretion were fundamentally different
and needed to be analyzed differently. But, upon reflection, the decision
not to pursue the guilty is often substantively the same as a decision
based on a belief in technical legal innocence. The police officer who
looks the other way when a car is going ten miles per hour over the speed
limit knows that the driver is technically guilty, but the officer is in effect
substituting his own rough and ready judgment of what should "really"
count as speeding for that of the legislature. To be sure, the officer could
also be lazy, drunk, or too near the end of his shift to bother. If we
assume a conscientious officer or prosecutor, however, the failure to
pursue the guilty is likely based on a substantive view of what guilt
entails. The actors are substituting their judgment of what the law
prohibits or at least using their own judgment to decide which offenders
2. My memory is a little foggy on the particular episode. It might have involved
parking violations that Andy normally ignored, but the point is the same. One reader of a
draft said I could check it out on the Andy Griffith web site and provide the episode
number but then wondered whether that would be a little too "geeky." Yes, I decided.
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are worth pursuing. Thus, whether based on a belief that the actor is not
guilty of what the legislature has defined as criminal or is not guilty of
the crime as redefined by the police officer or prosecutor, it is the same
use of discretion based on a belief in one or the other "kind" of
innocence.
The question I wish to pursue in the rest of the paper is what
motivates the act of discretion. We can begin with the "good" and the
"bad" acts of discretion in my title-when the motive is appropriate or
inappropriate. This leaves the "mundane" category for later discussion.
If we could be sure that discretion is based on laudable criteria, perhaps
everyone would trust police and prosecutors to look the other way when
a crime, as defined by the legislature, has occurred. Similarly, if the
reasons are laudable, perhaps we would be content to have the police or
prosecutor single out particular crimes for arrest or prosecution. In a
state that does not have "hate" crimes, for example, we might applaud a
prosecutor who more vigorously prosecuted a battery that was committed
out of racial hatred. A police officer might be more likely to arrest for
the same conduct if it creates a higher risk of harm-reckless driving
near a school as opposed to in a rural area.
Other types of "good" discretion include the youth of the offender,
the minor nature of the offense, and the lack of evidence that it is a
pattern of criminal behavior. Perhaps a crushing caseload that suggests
using police and prosecutorial resources for more serious offenses is also
a reason for discretion that we would consider "good." As for "bad"
motives, two categories are obvious: racism and sexism. Perhaps
decisions based on social class fall into the "bad" category too.
It seems to me that many motives are difficult to characterize as
either good or bad. Consider some reasons not to arrest: police observe
the crime near the end of their shift or when they are hungry or sleepy or
already have "enough" arrests for one shift. We can turn these around
and create reasons to arrest: police observe the crime when they are
bored or have just started their shift or need another arrest to please the
sergeant. Prosecutorial motives here include wanting a reputation for
being tough on crime (a reason to prosecute or insist on a tough deal) and
wanting to appear reasonable and flexible (a reason not to prosecute or to
offer a lenient deal). Prosecutors who are new to the job likely have a
different set of motives than prosecutors who are nearing retirement.
One could call these reasons "neutral," though it would not fit my
title. Moreover, I don't believe these are truly "neutral" reasons because
they are not based on desert and thus in a perfect world would not justify
a decision to pursue, or not pursue, an actor. I call them mundane
because they are characteristic of humans and human endeavors. As
with every effort to categorize anything, some cases will fall close to the
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lines marking the categories. Consider the officer who is drunk on duty.
This is pretty close to the "bad" category (as more than one reader
informed me), and repeated instances might lead to dismissal, but an
isolated incident seems to me to fall into the "mundane" rather than the
"bad" category. I intend my "mundane" category to include every
motive that is neither good nor bad. And I intend "good" to represent
motives that are truly laudable and "bad" to represent morally offensive
motives or motives that, if uncovered, would lead to dismissal. As so
construed, the "good" and "bad" categories are much smaller than the
"mundane" category.
It seems clear why discretion based on good motives is not so
troubling and why discretion based on bad motives is to be condemned.
But why would we not be offended by at least some decisions based on
mundane motives? Why should a cop's boredom level justify an arrest?
Why should a prosecutor's desire to have a certain image justify deciding
to prosecute? In truth, I am unsure that mundane reasons can justify an
exercise of discretion. But if they do, it is because these motives have
nothing to do with the individual's personal characteristics. These acts
of discretion can be compared to the results of a game of chance. Most
of the time when you commit a traffic offense, or smoke a marijuana
cigarette in the park, the roulette ball is not going to land on your
number. If it does, because the officer is bored, or the prosecutor is new
on the job and wants to build her reputation, well, that is just part of the
random chance of life. We are arrested or prosecuted, or not, because of
the vagaries of life. The state actor is simply the handmaiden of fate.
To explore the differences in discretion further, think for a moment
about how the good, the bad, and the mundane play out in real life.
Compare the decision of whether to arrest for a barroom brawl to a
decision of whether to arrest when answering a domestic disturbance
call. In the former case, one can imagine bad motives. The officer, for
example, might be of a different race than one of the combatants, or one
of the combatants might be the son of the mayor and the other might be
the son of a dock worker. But there is likely to be no consistent pattern
to these cases. If police decide to arrest in a barroom brawl case, they
probably view their job as arresting anyone who had a part and allowing
the prosecutor to sort out the participants on culpability grounds.
Moreover, police would not want to use race as part of their decision in
any kind of obvious way. Police want to protect their jobs and their
pensions.
If this is right, there is little reason to suspect wholesale bad motives
in barroom brawl cases.3 Instead, the officer's discretion is likely based
3. Indeed, one perceptive reader noted that the very locution "barroom brawl"
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on either good or mundane motives. Here are three examples of what I
would consider good motives: (1) the officer arrests only one actor
because the other was young or noticeably weaker; (2) the bartender
reports that neither patron has ever caused trouble before; and (3) the
officer concludes that the fact of the matter about who was the aggressor
will be very difficult to sort out. For examples of a mundane motive, it
might be that the officer just does not want to write up an arrest report or
the bartender asks him to look the other way.
Now consider the domestic abuse situation. Here, we can justifiably
believe that the husband is the aggressor and that the current assault is
not the first, nor will it be the last. If the police look the other way in
these cases, the discretion can be condemned because many of these acts
will be based on an improper motive-to favor the man's side of the
dispute over the woman's. It makes sense then for the legislature to
require the police always to make an arrest in a domestic violence
situation, even if we can imagine a subcategory of cases in which a
decision not to arrest would be the right decision. And it might make
sense, though this seems more contestable, to require prosecutors not to
decline to prosecute these cases.
Similarly, the decision whether to make, or not make, traffic arrests
can also can be infected with bad motive. Police decide whether to make
a traffic stop for dozens of reasons, but they might be motivated quite
often by race or class considerations. If the officer looks the other way
when the driver is white but almost always makes the stop when the
driver is black, these acts are based on a bad motive. One reason this is
bad discretion is that it is not like roulette. The ball does not randomly
fall in or out of your slot. If you are black, you are far more likely to
have it drop on you. If you are white, you are far less likely. This is
profoundly unfair and morally offensive.4
What about the case where the police make a traffic stop because
the driver has long hair or a "Dead" sticker or peace sticker on his
Volkswagen van, as happened to one of my students three years ago.
While driving cross country, he was stopped in Kansas, and consented to
a search that took almost an hour. Is this less offensive than the stop
based on race? The answer, I believe, depends on what we find morally
offensive about the race-based stop. Perhaps, because of our awful
history, imposing a penalty on account of race is particularly offensive.
If this is what makes the race-based stop improper, then cases of race are
connotes a bar populated by people of a certain social class. "Country club brawl" is not
a way of describing a fight that we see very often!
4. See George C. Thomas III, Blinded by the Light: How to Deter Racial
Profiling-Thinking About Remedies, 3 RUTGERS RACE & L. REv. 39 (2000).
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sui generis and the use of class, or sex for that matter, to decide how to
exercise discretion is different.
But while history counts, I think the real reason the race-based stop
is offensive is that it represents a rigged roulette game-the ball falls
disproportionately on a category of people, rather than randomly across
the universe of slots. This use of discretion punishes or rewards us
because of who we are, rather than what we did, which is I think at the
heart of why we find it morally offensive. This account explains why we
distrust police discretion that looks the other way when the assailant is
the husband and the victim is the wife. If police ignore a serious assault
because "men will be men" or because "she probably did something to
provoke him," then they are rewarding him because he is male and
punishing her because she is female.
This explanation of why some discretion is morally offensive
requires further elaboration. After all, my student could take the "Dead"
sticker off his car, and cut his hair, but one cannot change his race or sex.
But American tradition encourages self-expression and discourages
official punishment of that expression so I am inclined to think that a
stop based on the "Dead" sticker or my student's long hair is an exercise
of bad discretion.
For the same reasons, prosecutors should not be permitted to make
charging decisions based on the race, sex, or class of the defendant.
Punishment should fall only on those who deserve it, based on whatever
calculus the prosecutor uses to measure desert. Race, sex, and class do
not figure into a desert calculus. Moreover, if punishment is not going to
fall on the guilty through an act of discretion, it should be because of a
desert calculation and not because of race, sex, or class.
It goes without saying that bad discretion should not be exercised by
any actor in the system. As for good and mundane discretion, whether
we approve of the exercise might depend on who exercises the
discretion. If the reason not to prosecute the alleged rapist is because of
doubt about his guilt, I think we want the prosecutor and not the police to
make that decision. If the reason not to pursue an actor is because of the
trivial nature of the violation, we are probably happy to let the police
exercise discretion and to have the case reviewed by the prosecutor if the
police decide to arrest. Thus, we might be happy with the laws requiring
police to arrest everyone who assaults his spouse because we do not want
police making the guilt/innocence decision in these cases. On the other
hand, laws forbidding prosecutors from dismissing spousal abuse cases
raise more difficult questions because I think we want prosecutors to
screen innocent suspects out of the system as soon as possible.
The prosecutor is better equipped to make that judgment, at least
where serious crimes are concerned. First, the prosecutor has a case file
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in front of him that hopefully offers more insight into what really
happened than the police will possess. Second, I think we are more
likely to trust prosecutors to make this decision for a good reason rather
than a mundane or a bad reason. Prosecutors are lawyers and lawyers are
trained to take their personal preferences out of the calculus when
arguing a point or a case. I do not mean to say that lawyers succeed in
becoming calculating machines, but I do think our training makes us less
prone to acting on bad motives in exercising professional discretion. If
police have probable cause to arrest, and the crime is serious, then it is
the prosecutor's office in our system that acts as a filter to screen out
weak cases.
So far I have argued that discretion in enforcement and prosecution
is neither good nor bad as a global proposition. Some discretion is good,
on my account, and is to be encouraged. Some discretion is mundane
and thus, perhaps, to be tolerated and not condemned. Some is bad and
thus both harmful and morally offensive. The next question is what to do
about the bad discretion and what, if anything, to do about the mundane
discretion. A full discussion of that topic would take a very long paper
indeed, but I will sketch some preliminary thoughts in the few pages that
I have left.
III. Remedies for Bad-and Mundane?-Discretion
I realize people may disagree with my argument that discretion
motivated by good motives needs no remedy but I shall indulge that
assumption for the rest of the paper. For the other issues, the remedy
question needs to be broken into four categories: bad/police;
bad/prosecutor; mundane/police; and mundane/prosecutor. The problem
here is the one mentioned in the first sentence of my paper: "Discretion
in enforcement and prosecution of crime is inevitable; it can be
restrained at the margin but it cannot be eliminated."
Let's begin with mundane acts of discretion. They are mostly a
matter of human nature. We are all sometimes bored, lazy, indifferent to
our jobs, preoccupied with other things, physically tired, or prone to
feeling that we work too hard for too little money. All of these feelings
tempt us to cut comers and do it the easy way, whatever the relevant "it"
is. For example, how many law professors give more than one exam per
semester? 5 Trying to remove human nature from employment is, well,
5. One law professor reader of a draft recoiled at the notion that, by implication, I
was accusing him of being lazy because he gives only one exam per semester. Rest
assured that is not my point. My point is merely Bentham's point. See, e.g., JEREMY
BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION 15-16
(Hafner Press 1948) (1843 edition). Human actors seek to minimize unpleasant
experiences, one of which (to me) is grading blue books. I may spend more hours writing
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quixotic at best.
Another category of mundane discretion is perhaps more troubling.
Prosecutor A believes drugs are the scourge of human kind and, when
prosecuting a drug offense always charges the most serious crime
remotely plausible and seeks the most serious sentence allowed by law.
Prosecutor B believes that the war on drugs is the most harmful and
pointless social experiment since Prohibition. She thus seeks in various
ways to blunt the effect of drug laws on defendants. Prosecutor C
believes that the death penalty is the categorical imperative that Kant
claimed and charges it in every case where it is remotely plausible.
Prosecutor D believes the State lacks the moral authority to put people to
death, regardless of their crime, and refuses to charge capital offenses.
These are of course extreme examples but they allow me to make my
point.
Similarly situated defendants will thus be treated differently,
depending on the attitude of the prosecutor who represents the State, for
reasons that have nothing to do with the legislature's view of just deserts
and nothing to do with the individual defendant's just deserts. This
troubles many academics, including some in this symposium, notably
Ron Wright.6 I am less troubled. If we can keep innocent defendants
from being convicted, we are simply debating the proper punishment for
crime. Punishments vary widely by state. A defendant who commits an
atrocious murder in Iowa is not going to face the death penalty, because
Iowa has no death penalty. However, if the victim happened to be
standing just across the Missouri state line, the defendant might be
executed. How is this different from the luck of the draw involved in
committing a murder in Prosecutor C's district rather than D's?
Ron Wright approves of New Jersey's attempt to rein in mundane
discretion exercised by "line" prosecutors in certain kinds of cases. 7 I
take his underlying premise to be that each State is obliged to treat
similarly-situated defendants equally. On this view, the Iowa-Missouri
case is not the same as Prosecutor C in district two having a different
attitude than Prosecutor D in district three if both prosecutors are in the
same state. Perhaps Wright is correct to view equal punishment for
equal crimes within a single jurisdiction as implicit in justice. That is
certainly the premise of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. Perhaps I do
not require enough of justice. But from the defendant's perspective, how
is the prosecutorial discretion in the C-D case any more unjust than the
articles when I should be grading exams. The issue is not laziness. It is how we choose
to spend our time in the job setting.
6 See Ronald F. Wright, Prosecutor Guidelines and the New Terrain in New
Jersey, 109 PENN. ST. L. REV. 1087 (2005).
7. See id.
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legislative discretion in the Iowa-Missouri example. The latter, after all,
produces a death penalty or not, depending on which side of the state line
the victim happens to be when shot.
My argument, therefore, is that we must accept good discretion and
tolerate mundane discretion. As to bad discretion, we have to start small.
Beginning with police, it is difficult to know the extent to which police
are exercising bad discretion. We do not know, for example, the rate at
which whites and blacks commit particular crimes. Thus, we would have
no way to know whether police are arresting blacks at a higher rate than
whites. One way to avoid that problem is to focus on a crime where the
rate of commission seems likely to be constant across racial groups. A
place to start is motor vehicle offenses. Intuition suggests, and a few
studies tend to confirm, that various racial groups violate traffic laws at
roughly the same rate. A New Jersey study, for example, showed that
blacks constituted about fifteen percent of speeders on the New Jersey
Turnpike but constituted forty-six percent of those stopped for speeding. 8
This disparity is over sixteen standard deviations from what random
chance would predict, which makes it almost one hundred percent certain
that something other than chance explained the disparity in stops based
on race.
Is there a solution to this exercise of bad discretion? A starting
place is the proposed federal legislation that would require police to keep
records of traffic stops based on race of the driver.9 But what remedy
should result when individual officers or departments demonstrate that
they are making stops in part based purely on race? In an earlier paper, I
rejected, as largely futile, any attempt to "police the police" by
threatening individual offenders with criminal or civil sanctions. 10
Officers who make stops or arrests based on race will seek to disguise
their use of race to protect themselves from liability.
Even if we can show that a black motorist is three times more likely
to be stopped on the New Jersey Turnpike than should be the case, the
officer who can prove the black motorist was in fact speeding has what
amounts to a perfect defense. How would we amass evidence of the
white speeders the officer ignores? We could do studies of all the drivers
on all the highways in the State, but would those data prove that on this
day, on this stretch of highway, the usual number of white speeders was
present?
8 State v. Soto, 734 A.2d 350, 353 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1996).
9. See The Traffic Stops Statistics Act, H.R. 118, 105th Cong. (1997), discussed in
David A. Harris, Addressing Racial Profiling in the States: A Case Study of the "New
Federalism" in Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 367, 386-89
(2001).
10. See Thomas, supra note 3.
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Perhaps the comparability problem could be solved, but I think the
focus on individual officers is too expensive and too intrusive. What we
need is a systemic solution that is more easily managed. As I have
proposed before," to a response that can only be described as a
deafening silence, it makes more sense to target police departments as a
whole. Congress could deny federal money to departments that engage
in racially-biased traffic enforcement. The law could require
departments to keep records and could create a presumption of racially-
biased enforcement when a court finds a statistically significant disparity
in stops based on race. This would still require studies to determine the
traffic offense rate for racial groups in the relevant area, but if the goal is
to assess an entire department or state police unit over a long period of
time, the comparability problem is much less severe.
One friend pointed out that in the wake of September 11, I could not
expect Congress to deny federal funds to a police department found
guilty of exercising bad discretion in traffic offenses. While my friend
did not explain the comment, I took it to mean two things. First, police
departments generally get more latitude in the post-9/11 world. Second,
some people might applaud the use of discretion to identify young Arab
men who might be terrorists and thus Congress might be reluctant to
intrude into police discretion in making traffic stops.12
My proposal was first made before 9/11 and my friend was gently
suggesting that whatever salience it might have had is now gone. If so, it
means we are not serious about rooting out bad police discretion in
making traffic stops. Maybe we are willing to live with it, as a cost of
doing business in the war on terror. But any other solution is, I think,
whistling past the graveyard. Discretion is too easy to disguise to have
any realistic hope of targeting individual exercises. In my view, the
solution is either a systemic one or nothing at all.
Outside the context of traffic stops, restraining bad police discretion
looks impossible to me. Imagine the encounters police have on the
street. How would we ever have a defensible baseline that would tell us
whether police make suspicion-less stops of blacks more often than
whites? To begin, we would have to keep track of each time an officer
approached a potential suspect. We would have to know when an
"approach" turns into a "stop" for purposes of the Fourth Amendment.
Moreover, even if we had those numbers, an officer can explain a stop
based on "furtive" gestures or "he looked nervous when I approached" or
11. See Thomas, supra note 3.
12. Indeed, I have argued that limited kinds of racial profiling of young Muslim men
might be constitutional. See George C. Thomas Il1, Terrorism, Race, and a New
Approach to Consent Searches, 73 Miss. L.J. 525 (2003).
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"he was trying not to look nervous when I approached." Without a
videotape, we could not begin to check the officer's story. And even
with a videotape, whether a gesture is "furtive," or a look is suspicious, is
pretty much a judgment call. Limiting that kind of bad police discretion
seems hopeless to me.
We are left with one category: prosecutors exercising bad
discretion. Assuming that it sometimes exists, how could we restrain it?
We could institute a system like Germany's, where prosecutors are
"supervised by a superior in a hierarchical system headed by the Minister
of Justice, who is himself responsible to the cabinet.,"1 3 Moreover, "the
prosecutor is obliged by law to file charges whenever there is 'sufficient'
suspicion that the suspect has committed a crime. The standard of
sufficiency to be applied in this context is likelihood that the suspect will
be convicted after trial." 14  Decisions to dismiss charges can be
challenged by victims. 5 Decisions to prosecute or not prosecute are
subject to review by a judge.
The German system is more bureaucratic and hierarchical than the
typical American jurisdiction. The tentative efforts in New Jersey to
restrain the discretion of "line" prosecutors are more bureaucratic and
hierarchical than most systems. But do they restrain bad discretion or
only provide more actors with an opportunity to exercise bad discretion?
Remember, the issue here is not the mundane discretion that Ron Wright
wants to restrain to achieve consistency. I have argued that we can
tolerate mundane discretion as the luck of the draw. Here I am
discussing bad discretion: racism and sexism. Why would supervising
prosecutors be less prone toward conscious or unconscious racism or
sexism than line prosecutors? For that matter, why would judges be any
more immune from the influence of racism or sexism?
Involving victims is also unlikely to provide a solution to existing
racism in the charging of crimes. In the German scheme, victims rarely
contest the official decision about charging crime, although Thomas
Weigend reports that "the mere existence of the possibility of judicial
review provides a check on arbitrary dismissals by prosecutors."1 6 More
fundamentally, the German involvement of victims does not provide
relief to the defendants who are charged because of bad discretion. In
13. KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 194-95
(Louisiana State University Press 1969).
14. Thomas Weigend, Germany, in Criminal Procedure: A Worldwide Study 205
(Craig Bradley ed. 1999).
15. See Bernd Schiinemann, The Role of the Victim Within the Criminal Justice
System: A Three-Tiered Concept, 3 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 33, 44 (1999) (citing §§ 170-75
StPO [German criminal procedure statute]).
16. Weigend, supra note 12, at 206 (providing no supporting data).
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the German model, victims can only check discretion when prosecutors
seek to dismiss cases. Therefore, even if victims were wildly successful
in preventing the dismissal of cases against culpable white defendants,
the result would provide only psychological succor to blacks charged
with crimes on the basis of their race. Except in a statistical sense, this is
no remedy at all.
So what have we learned? Re-read the first sentence of the paper.
Discretion is inevitable. Some of it is good. Much of it comes from
traits of human nature that cannot be changed, what I have called
mundane discretion. Some of it is bad because it is based on stereotypes
about or animus toward women, minority racial groups, and lower
socioeconomic classes. A little of the bad discretion can be restrained,
perhaps, if we are willing to spend large amounts of time and money on
record-keeping, fact-finding, and bureaucratic reviews.
Is this a gloomy conclusion to my paper? Well, yes and no. Here I
benefit from my age and background. I grew up in a very small town in
West Tennessee in the 1950s. Blacks were forbidden by law from
attending the schools I attended. Blacks were forbidden by social
practice from entering stores. Black residents of the town had to knock
on the back door of the store, await the shop-keeper's arrival, and tell
him what items they wanted. Did Brown v. Board of Education17 and the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 solve all the racial problems in America?
Hardly. But those brave acts addressed some of the overt, systemic
problems. And today we live in a different era. I believe that what
connects Americans to each other is more powerful than the forces that
divide us. I believe that as the twenty-first century ages, the stereotypes
that motivate various prejudices will fade.
What better solution to the problem of discretion in the criminal
justice system than to have a criminal justice system in which the actors
lack prejudice against other groups of Americans. In that world, the only
kinds of discretion we would have would be the good and the mundane.
As I have suggested, I think we can live with those acts of discretion.
17. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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